Impact Area Review Team
Falmouth Holiday Inn
Falmouth, MA
August 28, 2001
6:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Meeting Summary

Handouts Distributed at Meeting:

1. August 28, 2001 Draft Meeting Agenda
2. July 24, 2001 Draft Action Items
3. July 24, 2001 Draft Meeting Minutes
4. IAGWSP Tour Information
5. Rapid Response Action - Mortar Target 9 Update
6. Screening Values and Standards for Detected Compounds in Soil
7. Snake Pond Diffusion Sampling Update
8. DRAFT: UXO Discoveries/Dispositions Since 07-24-01
9. USACE Information Paper re: Former H Range
10. Groundwater Study Update - IART Briefing 8/28/01
11. Presentation handout: Investigation Update
12. Presentation handout: CS-18 (Gun Position 9) Supplemental Site Investigation Update
13. Presentation handout: Phase IIb Report
14. Presentation handout: Central Impact Area Soil Report

Agenda Item #1. Welcome, Approval of July 24, 2001 Meeting Minutes, Review Draft Agenda

Mr. Jasinski convened the meeting at 6:02 p.m. He announced that he is facilitating tonight's meeting because Mr. Jim Murphy is on vacation. The team members introduced themselves. Mr. Jasinski noted that both Ms. Pepin and Ms. Hayes were approved for Impact Area Review Team (IART) membership and he welcomed them to the team.

Mr. Jasinski asked if there were any changes to be made to the July 24, 2001 meeting minutes. Mr. Hugus referred to page 9 of the minutes and stated that the discussion regarding depleted uranium (DU) did not accurately reflect what he, Dr. Feigenbaum, and Mr. James Kinney stated. He said that he would like to see a paragraph added that addresses the fact that levels of DU were detected at twice the background, and therefore he, Dr. Feigenbaum, and Mr. Kinney believe that further investigation is warranted.

Mr. Gregson referred to the second paragraph from the bottom on page 8 and noted that "DU shave charges" should read "DU shape charges." He noted that the second paragraph on page 10 should read "popper" kettle instead of "copper kettle." He also stated that additional data is missing from the same paragraph, and said that he would pass the information on to Ms. DeBaggis to include with the changes. He then noted that di-n-butyl phthalate is misspelled under the J Range investigation discussion. He added that "fluorine" should be "fluoranthene". Mr. Gregson next referred to the first paragraph on page 11 and said that "E&RC" should be "AEC" for Army Environmental Center. Mr. Jasinski asked if there were any more changes to the minutes, and hearing none, he noted that the minutes were approved with the changes.

Mr. Jasinski reviewed the agenda and noted that Mr. Judge will address the team regarding his potential membership.

Agenda Item #2. Review Action Items

Mr. Jasinski referred to Action Item #2 and noted that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Joint Program Office (JPO), the Impact Area Groundwater Study Program (IAGWSP), and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) have incorporated the IART's comments into a revised Snake Pond posting. The comments were sent to Mr. Dave Mason at the Sandwich Board of Health, who has the final say regarding re-posting the pond. Mr. Hugus asked for a copy of the letter. Mr. Jasinski said that a copy of the letter and the posting will be included in the next weekly IART mailing.

Mr. Hugus noted that the action item indicates that the agencies will discuss updating the Snake Pond posting. He said that he and other team members did not express concern about updating the posting, but rather they felt that it was misleading to the public because modeling indicates that Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX) would be upwelling into Snake Pond approximately 250 feet downgradient of the spit in the pond. He stated that swimming season is almost over and he faults the agencies - especially MDPH - for not addressing this issue sooner.

Mr. Judge's Remarks

Mr. Jasinski asked Mr. Judge to please address the team.

Mr. Judge stated that he is a Sandwich Selectman and a member of the Senior Management Board (SMB). He said that he thinks his membership on the IART would be a "nice fit" and that he could serve as a liaison between the SMB and the IART. He stated that he is extremely concerned about the health and welfare of the citizens of Cape Cod and thinks that the IART is where " the rubber hits the road."

Mr. Schlesinger asked Mr. Judge if he will represent the Town of Sandwich as an IART member. Mr. Judge stated that he will serve as a citizen on the IART and does not intend to represent the citizens of Sandwich or the members of the SMB, unless directed to do so.

Mr. Jasinski asked team members to submit any questions or comments regarding Mr. Judge's potential membership to Mr. Murphy by Friday, August 31, 2001.

At this time Mr. Cambareri asked that an update on petroleum-like materials (PLM) be added to the agenda under "Other Issues." Mr. Hugus asked that updates also be provided on the H Range, the buried tank found at the J Range, Chemical Spill 19 (CS-19), the Snake Pond diffusion samplers, and the contained detonation chamber (CDC) under "Other Issues." Mr. Jasinski added these items to the agenda.

Agenda Item #3. Phase IIb Report

Mr. Gregson reported that the Phase IIb Report addresses 14 sites, including small arms ranges, training areas, and other sites, which were identified by EPA for investigation. He noted that the Guard recommended no further action at eight sites, but six sites do require some level of additional investigation. He asked team members to provide comments on the report to him by September 11, 2001.

Mr. Gregson stated that most of the 350 soil samples were collected from surface to two feet below surface. Approximately 20% of the samples were analyzed for the entire sweep of Phase I analytes, which includes volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semi-volatile organic compounds, explosives (SVOCs), metals, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and ethylene dibromide (EDB). He noted that five monitoring wells were installed as part of the Phase IIb investigation.

Inactive Demo Sites

Mr. Gregson first referred to findings at the inactive demolition sites. He displayed a map depicting the location of the sites, which are on the west central side of the base. He stated that 13 samples were collected from two grids in this location and there were no detections of any compounds above background or the preliminary remediation goals. He reported that two wells, monitoring wells 150 (MW-150) and MW-151, were installed immediately downgradient of the demo sites and there were no detections of explosives in the groundwater samples. However, thallium was detected at 2.2 parts per billion (ppb) in the shallow screen at MW-150. He noted that this was the only constituent detected above maximum containment level (MCL) or health advisory. The health advisory for thallium is 2 ppb. Mr. Gregson stated that the Guard recommends that the groundwater in this area should continue to be monitored. He added that the Guard also intends to seek more information, through the archive search process, on the nature of activities at these inactive demolition sites. He said that there is little information on these sites other than the 1940s-era map, which depicts them as demolition sites.

Mr. Schlesinger referred to page 68 of technical team memorandum 01-13 on the Central Impact Area Soil Report. He said that an article by Jenkins is referenced, which suggests that method 8330 may not capture the full range of concentrations of explosives at artillery and mortar ranges. He asked why method 8330 was used if it in fact does not capture the full range of explosives. Mr. Gregson stated that the Guard is looking into this matter. Mr. Borci explained that method 8330 has been expanded to include 19 explosive compounds, and it addresses just about everything that could have possibly been used at these sites. He added that other methods may be considered because the detection limit may need to be lower.

Mr. Hugus asked if there were no single discreet detections of explosives. Mr. Gregson replied that both discreet and composite samples were collected and all were nondetect for explosives. Mr. Hugus explained that his question is relevant to the Central Impact Area Soil Report where contaminants were dropped as contaminants of concern (COCs) based on composite samples. He said that he thinks that averaging screens out individual detections. Mr. Gregson stated that the results he is reporting have not yet gone through the COC process.

Former C Range

Mr. Gregson stated that the former C Range is one of the three unbermed small arms ranges that were evaluated under the Phase IIb program. This particular range is located on the north side of Frank Perkins Road, near training area BA7, and it was used in the 1940s as a machine gun range. He reported that 40 samples were collected at 18 locations along the firing line and the natural backstop that exists on the east side of the range. The soil results showed no detections of propellant compounds along the firing line. However, metal detections, predominately lead, were found above screening criteria in 10 out of 27 samples collected from the backstop. Lead also was detected at 5 out of 13 samples collected at the firing point. He reported that lead levels exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching process (TCLP) hazardous waste threshold of 5 parts per million (ppm) in three of the samples, which were collected from shallow soil. The deeper samples did not exceed the 5 ppm TCLP screening level.

Mr. Gregson reported that the recommendation for the former C Range is further evaluation of the levels of metals and removal of the soils, if needed.

Ms. Adams said that she thought the TCLP for lead had changed and is now 0.75 ppm. Mr. Gregson explained that 0.75 ppm is the uniform treatment standard, as opposed to the standard that differentiates between a hazardous versus a non-hazardous material. The former standard is the one that has to be met for the soil to be disposed at an unlined landfill. Ms. Adams said that she thinks this is relevant for the purpose of cleanup. Mr. Gregson stated that the Guard and EPA agreed to disagree on this point regarding the lead berm project, though the standard was met on that particular project. Ms. Adams said that it is EPA's point of view that 0.75 ppm is the relevant standard.

Former D Range

Mr. Gregson stated that the former D Range also was included in the Phase IIb investigation. It is located near Pine Hill up by Range Control in the western part of the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). He reported that former D Range was also used since the 1940s for rifle, pistol, and machine gun training.

Mr. Gregson reported that 35 soil samples were collected from 13 locations along the firing line to the southwest, and from the backstop to the northeast. He stated that MW-174 was installed at the downgradient edge at the backstop. The propellant compound n-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected in firing line samples, at levels below the MMR preliminary remediation goal (PRG). There were also detections of metals, including antimony, copper, and lead; these were above screening criteria in samples from the backstop. There were also detections of lead at levels above the leachability criteria of 5 ppb. Mr. Gregson reported that thallium was detected in the groundwater sample from MW-174. He noted that the detection was 2.4 ppb, but the sample result currently is unvalidated.

Mr. Gregson stated that recommendations for the former D Range are further evaluation of the conditions found at the target berm where the detections of lead were the highest, and continued monitoring at MW-174.

Dr. Feigenbaum asked what was fired at the range. Mr. Gregson replied that he does not have the particulars on the rounds, but that rifles, pistols, and machine guns were fired at the range. Dr. Feigenbaum asked when the range was last used. Mr. Grant stated that he believes the range was last used in 1961. Dr. Feigenbaum pointed out that the contamination has persisted since 1961. Mr. Gregson concurred and said that metals in particular are still found in the berm 40 years later.

Mr. Hugus asked why MW-174 is located in the middle of what might be a source area, rather than 40 years downgradient. Mr. Gregson explained that metals and lead are not expected to be in the water table within that timeframe. He said that he thinks the well is situated in a good spot to catch any contamination on its way to the water table. Mr. Hugus said he thinks this might be true with regard to lead, but he questioned whether other propellants might have leached into the groundwater and are now downgradient of MW-174. Mr. Gregson replied that small arms were fired at this location, and therefore it is not likely that propellants would be found at the target berm. Mr. Hugus said that was not true at the Golf and India Ranges. Mr. Gregson pointed out that the investigation there looked at the firing line as opposed to the target berms themselves. He added that there was a detection of n-nitrosodiphenylamine at the firing line at the former D Range.

Mr. Hugus asked why a well has not been installed downgradient of the firing line. Mr. Gregson replied that the well location was chosen based on soil data indicating the highest levels of contaminants at this particular range. He explained that the highest detection was 160 ppm of n-nitrosodiphenylamine, which is below the PRG.

Dr. Feigenbaum stated that he thinks this is a good place to start the investigation, not stop it. He agreed with Mr. Hugus's opinion that wells should be installed downgradient. Mr. Grant stated that the range actually was last used in the 1980s. Mr. Cambareri also agreed that a well should be installed downgradient of the firing point, rather than the berm.

Mr. Borci stated that the Phase IIb workplan was well under way when the first results from the current small arms ranges were received. The firing point locations at the older ranges were added at the last minute. He said that the plan included installation of monitoring wells in locations with the highest detections of lead and TCLP lead in soils. He explained that future decisions will be made based on the data in the report, and information regarding newer ranges.

Cleared Area 1

Mr. Gregson next referred to the Cleared Area, which is located in the northwest part of the Impact Area. He noted that 17 samples were collected from two locations in this area, and reported that 2A-dinitrotoluene (2A-DNT) was detected in one sample at 180 ppb. There were also detections of aluminum, antimony, iron, manganese, and vanadium at levels above the screening criteria. He said that the most unexpected detection was of trichloroethylene (TCE), which was found in six of the samples, with a maximum detection of 13 ppb.

Mr. Gregson said that recommendations for this site include a supplemental site inspection and some additional characterization of the area.

Dr. Feigenbaum asked what 4A-DNT is. Mr. Gregson explained that it is a breakdown product of trinitrotoluene (TNT). Mr. Jasinski stated that the team members will be provided with chemistry ring diagrams depicting 4A-DNT and other related compounds.

Mr. Dow asked where the vanadium and antimony comes from in the rounds. Mr. Gregson said that he will find out and report back to the team.

Mr. Hugus asked whether the TCE detection is validated. Mr. Grant confirmed that it is not. Mr. Gregson pointed out that TCE was detected in six samples, and noted that it is unusual to detect TCE in surface soil 40 years later. He stated that the supplemental site inspection will focus on the TCE detections.

GN-2

Mr. Gregson stated that the GN-2 grenade court is located on the north side of Howe Road, near the intersection of Frank Perkins Road. He reported that this area was used in the 1950s for practice with hand grenades and high explosive (HE) fragmentation grenades. This same area is also the location of gun position 11 (GP-11).

Mr. Gregson reported that 21 samples were collected from seven locations at the target base and the debris piles within the wooded area north of GP-11. Ethyl-centralite was detected at 325 ppb, and 2,4-DNT was detected at a maximum of 2.9 ppb. There were also detections of 4-nitrophenol, di-n-butyl phthalate, and n-nitrosodiphenylamine. He noted that the detections were located close to the firing position. He said that further characterization of this area will be carried out as part of the gun position assessment.

GA/GB Ranges

Mr. Gregson reported that the GA/GB Ranges were used as known distance rifle ranges in the 1940s. Significant features that were noted during the site reconnaissance include a soil berm observed with bullet fragments, an east-west drainage ditch, former firing lines, and a coal ash and slag pile along the 100-yard firing line of the GA Range.

Mr. Gregson reported that 69 samples were collected from 25 locations. He stated that there were exceedances of lead and manganese in the berm samples. The screening criteria was exceeded for metals in the 25 drainage ditch samples specifically for aluminum, antimony, arsenic, cadmium, iron, lead, manganese, and vanadium. There were also detections of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and one of the PCB aroclors. Propellant and explosive compounds detected in one sample include nitroglycerine and pentaerythitol tetranitrate (PETN). He added that 2,4-DNT and di-n-butyl phthalate were detected in the sample from grid 143.

Mr. Gregson also reported that 23 firing line samples were collected and antimony was detected in five samples, aluminum in two samples, and iron in three samples, all above the screening criteria. In addition, the pesticide dieldrin was detected above criteria. He stated that there were also detections of 2,4-DNT, 4-nitrophenol, and n-nitrosodiphenylamine in sample grid 143V.

Mr. Gregson stated that the recommendations for this area include the removal of impacted sediments from the drainage ditch, and a look at the design of the storm water discharge drainage ditch.

Mr. Hugus said that he is interested in knowing the specific levels of contaminants that were detected. He noted that it is not necessarily helpful to know that detections are above screening criteria without knowing by how much. Dr. Feigenbaum agreed with Mr. Hugus and requested that detection information include the actual level and the screening criteria. Mr. Gregson said that perhaps he could create a table reflecting the requested information.

Ms. Hayes asked how long this study has been going on and approximately how much money it has cost. Mr. Gregson replied that he has been working on the Phase IIb investigation for eight months and the cost of the investigation is approximately 2 to 3 million dollars at this point.

Small Arms Ranges Investigation Update

Mr. Gregson reminded the team members that soil sampling and air monitoring were conducted at the end of last year at some of the small arms ranges, including Sierra East (SE), I, and G Ranges. The small arms ranges were selected based on recent use as well as long-term duration of relatively high use. Discreet samples were collected from nine point grids located along the firing lines at each range. A total of 35 samples were analyzed for metals and SVOCs.

Mr. Gregson reported that results from the Phase IIb investigation were similar to those from the previous soil-sampling event. N-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected in 26 samples, di-n-butyl phthalate was detected in 22 samples, 2,4-DNT was detected in 13 samples, n-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected in seven samples, ethyl-centralite was detected in three samples, and 2,6-DNT was detected in one sample. Mr. Gregson stated that the 2,4-DNT detection is the only one to exceed the MMR PRG. Propellants were detected at both the former ranges and the more recently used ranges. Mr. Gregson stated that lead was detected in 12 of 32 samples at G Range and I Range, and antimony was detected in four samples at the G and SE Ranges. Lead was detected above criteria in the former C Range, and antimony was seen at the GA and GB Ranges.

Mr. Gregson reported that the next step is to attempt to characterize any impacts to groundwater. He reported that today he received an emissions study from the Army Environmental Center (AEC) for the 5.56 round, which were the same kind of rounds used at these three ranges. The study will help to determine whether, for instance, the 2,4-DNT detections are a result of the small arms weapons systems or from previous activities.

Mr. Schlesinger asked where the 2,4-DNT detections were located. Mr. Gregson replied that 2,4-DNT was detected in the G Range. Mr. Schlesinger asked Mr. Gregson if ranges that are currently in use have similar detections. Mr. Gregson replied that he anticipated that these compounds would be detected at other ranges, but probably at lower concentrations if the ranges had lower historic use. He added that these ranges continue to be used today.

Dr. Feigenbaum said that he thought studies were going to continue at the small arms ranges. Mr. Borci explained that future follow-up will in part be determined based on the information contained in the AEC emissions report, which was received today. Dr. Feigenbaum stated that contaminants seem to be found at all the small arms ranges, and he noted that the same propellant is being used in the green ammunitions. Mr. Gregson said that the AEC report cited that fewer compounds were detected in the green ammo. Dr. Feigenbaum said that he does not trust reports generated by the AEC because, he doesn't believe it is a disinterested party. Mr. Hugus stated that he does not trust the AEC. He said that he thinks the whole project has been dragged out because the Guard wants to continue firing at the ranges. He said that the ranges that are currently used have fresh DNT in their soil, which means the firing is bad for the environment and should be stopped. He asked the regulators to act on this issue. Mr. Gregson reported that he will make copies of the AEC report available to team members.

Ms. Pepin stated that she has not received copies of the technical memoranda. Mr. Gregson said that he will send her copies of the referenced documents and make sure she is on the mailing list.

Mr. Dow stated that the final Environmental Impact Report (EIR) failed to define compatible training, and it claimed that most of the pollution in the northern 15,000 acres occurred before 1980. He encouraged EPA to proceed posthaste in the event that contamination is occurring at currently used ranges. Mr. Dow also stated that he thinks that the detection of thallium is an unresolved problem that warrants further investigation.

Agenda Item #4. Central Impact Area Soil Report

Mr. Gregson stated that the Central Impact Area (CIA) Soil Report focuses on identified COC for the soil at the CIA and also addresses the distribution, nature, and extent of the compounds detected. He noted that the CIA is located in the central portion of Camp Edwards and consists of approximately 2000 acres.

Mr. Gregson stated that targets sampled in the CIA included, tanks, armored personnel carriers, cars, and buoys. He also noted that munitions used prior to World War II contained primarily TNT, whereas post World War II munitions are comprised of a mixture of RDX and TNT.

Mr. Gregson reported that over 2000 soil samples were collected at 279 locations, including 36 targets in the CIA. Samples were also taken from boreholes and from craters created by blow-in-place activities. He explained that COCs were identified using two scenarios; the potential for compounds to leach into groundwater, and the health risk imposed by ingestion or direct contact. Six explosive compounds and TNT breakdown products were identified as COCs.

Mr. Gregson stated that contaminants primarily were found from surface to the first foot of soil. No COCs were detected below two feet in any of the borehole samples, and in general the highest concentrations were found within 20 feet of the targets. He stated that RDX was the most frequently detected COC.

Mr. Gregson stated that soil data indicate that the distribution of explosives is heterogeneous, and concentrations decrease rapidly with depth. He explained that the distribution suggests that explosions of munitions near targets resulted in deposition of explosives, particularly on the ground surface over a fairly extensive area.

Mr. Gregson stated that a significant portion of the target sampling is yet to be completed. There are 13 targets that remain to be characterized. He said that Phase II of the high use target area (HUTA) will also ensue; this will focus on collecting data to learn more about the distribution of explosive compounds and unexploded ordnance (UXO) extending out from the target. He added that investigations will also be conducted near the targets for polychlorinated naphthalene compounds. Future investigations will also include collecting data on physical parameters, organic carbon, and pH to help with modeling. He added that this is all leading to the development and initial screening of alternatives for remediation of the soil.

Discussion

Mr. Schlesinger stated that he thinks the draft Phase I report was a farce and it is wrong to say that the concentrations of explosives found in groundwater were not high enough to identify any significant soil contamination. He then referred to page 5 of the CIA Soil Report technical memorandum which states, "no explosives were detected in any of the soil samples using method 8830," but which fails to mention whether explosives were detected using other methods. He noted that on page 20 there is a reference to a fate and transport report due in August 2001, and asked if that report is in fact available.

Mr. Gregson replied that the data to which Mr. Schlesinger referred to are not in report form at this point. However, the data are being used for modeling at Demo Area 1 and the CIA. Mr. Schlesinger requested that a copy of the data be forwarded to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) representatives on the IART. Mr. Schlesinger requested a copy of the Jenkins article referenced on page 68 of the document.

Mr. Hugus said that he is interested in hearing from EPA regarding the method used to identify the six COCs. He said that he thinks using composite samples and arithmetically averaging samples allows for any contaminant to be ruled out as a COC. Mr. Borci stated that EPA has directed the Guard to use the highest concentration in the composite examples. He said that EPA will continue to evaluate the COCs.

Mr. Hugus said that he is pleased to see that the Guard, on page 141 of the report, concludes that "the data does not support the hypothesis of there being an unidentified cache of UXO, rather the various data sources all point to a non-point source term extending over a wide spatial area. The pattern of groundwater contamination and soil contamination is consistent with the wide distribution of explosive particulates deposited on the surface of the soil." And it ends by saying, "groundwater has been impacted by explosives by military training activity." Mr. Hugus stated that this admission puts to rest an ongoing debate.

Mr. Hugus also said that it would be helpful if EPA's and DEP's comments were available to the team members to review before their own comments were due to be submitted. Mr. Borci said that EPA is working on that, but sometimes it's a matter of scheduling and deadlines.

Mr. Cambareri requested that the Guard provide a water level survey overlay on the Central Impact Area Aerial Magnetometry data map.

Agenda Item #5. CS-18 Update

Mr. Aker explained that CS-18 is also known as GP-9. He said that GP-9 was used for firing field artillery into the Impact Area, which occurred from World War II until all artillery firing was shut down.

Mr. Aker stated that in 1994 the Army conducted a site inspection at the site, at which point 18 soil locations and four background locations were sampled. He reported that 2,4-DNT and 2,6-DNT were found in the majority of the surface soil samples. Four monitoring wells were installed to the water table, which were nondetect for any contaminants.

Mr. Aker stated that the objective for the CS-18 supplemental site inspection was to further determine the nature and extent of soil contamination and groundwater contamination, and to form a preliminary risk evaluation (PRE). The decision point is scheduled for December, at which time it will be determined whether a decision document, remedial investigation, or an engineering evaluation and cost analysis (EE/CA) will be implemented.

Mr. Aker displayed a map of CS-18 and pointed out the various locations where samples were taken, both past and current. He also pointed out MW-5 and MW-6. He noted that a five-star pattern was used for sampling. The five locations were sampled and were then composited. Sampling occurred at two intervals; zero to six inches, and 18 to 24 inches. He said that 2,4-DNT and 2,6-DNT was pretty widespread throughout the site, and mostly detected in the first foot and a half.

Mr. Aker reported that chlorinated hydrocarbon solvents were detected during groundwater screen drilling. He said that tetrachloroethylene (PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE) were found riding on the top of the silt layer at approximately 170 feet. He explained that the screen was set at the top of the silt layer in MW-5, which had detections of 2.5 ppb for PCE and 2.7 ppb for TCE. Measurable concentrations of metals were detected in all monitoring wells, including aluminum, calcium, cobalt, magnesium, sodium, zinc, barium, chromium, iron, manganese, and vanadium. Mr. Aker stated that the risk screening currently under way will be followed by recommendations for the future.

Mr. Aker then displayed maps depicting the 1994 investigation and the current effort, and noted that the contour has changed slightly.

Discussion

Mr. Hugus inquired about the history the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) has concerning CS-18. Mr. Aker replied that DNT was first discovered during a Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) investigation in 1994. However, he believes that CS-18 itself was identified in 1992. Mr. Hugus stated that the IRP has known about CS-18 since 1992 and has a remedial action milestone scheduled for 2003. He stated that he thinks nine years is too long to take action on DNT in the soil at this site.

Mr. Cambareri asked how confident Mr. Aker is that MW-2 and MW-1 are located downgradient of the highest DNT concentrations. Mr. Aker replied that these locations were selected based on information from the four initial wells installed by the Army.

Agenda Item #6. Investigations Update

Mr. Gregson reported that there were only a few detections of explosives in groundwater samples from wells that were previously clean or newly detected. There was a detection of RDX at 0.38 ppb in MW-18; however, this detection has not yet been validated. The samples collected from MW-173, which is downgradient of Demo Area 1, were nondetect. However, MW-175, which is located just north of MW-173 had several explosive detections, which may be due to interference from contaminants on the drilling equipment. He reported that the third well, D1P8, is proposed to be drilled just to the north of MW-175, and will probably be installed early this fall.

Mr. Gregson reported that perchlorate was previously detected at MW-13D, which is located north of the J-3 Range. He noted that a laboratory error was uncovered and it now appears that that well should have been nondetect. Mr. Gregson stated that perchlorate was detected in MW-163 at 67 ppb. He said that this is the highest concentration detected in this vicinity of MMR, and it exceeds other detections at the J Ranges by an order of magnitude. There is also a detection of perchlorate of 6 ppb in MW-145M1. He added that there is also an unvalidated perchlorate detection in Demo Area 1.

Mr. Hugus said that he thinks MW-175, which is believed to have had interference in the sample, is way off track from Demo Area 1, and the obvious track would be farther south. Mr. Gregson said that it appears that the Demo Area 1 plume takes a significant bend to the north. Mr. Hugus stated that the modeling at Demo Area 1 has been problematic, and he thinks that the wells should be further to the south, not the north. Mr. Borci explained that the Guard's latest modeling indicates that it is likely that wells 175 and D1P8 are actually in the core of the plume, if it has migrated out that far. Mr. Jasinski suggested that the Guard provide a better, more updated map to accurately depict the well locations.

Mr. Hugus asked about the status of delineating a plume for the J Range detections. Mr. Gregson replied that additional data are being collected from the J Ranges. Mr. Hugus encouraged the Guard to depict a plume shell around the detections. Ms. Dolan pointed out that the J Range report is scheduled for submission on September 5, 2001, and the Guard is going to submit an initial delineation of the plume by September 16, 2001. Mr. Gregson stated that the J Ranges are by far the most complicated areas under investigation.

Ms. Pepin requested an updated map depicting the J Ranges, Demo Area 1, and the Central Impact Area. Mr. Gregson said those areas can be incorporated into a base map.

Agenda Item #7. Other Issues

Former H Range

Mr. Hugus said that the handout concerning the former H Range, does not mention the HE mortar round that was found on Camp Good News property. Mr. Gregson read from the handout, "Two unexploded ordnances were uncovered and were blown-in-place on August 16. One anomaly was located on MMR property. The second anomaly was located about 50 feet off MMR, on private property." Mr. Hugus stated it does not say that HE rounds were found on Camp Good News, which is used recreationally. Mr. Gregson said that the Army Corps is working closely with the owners of Camp Good News. Also, the former H Range was formerly used as a defense site, so it is not an unusual find.

Snake Pond Diffusion Sampler Update

Mr. Gregson stated that he reported at the last IART meeting that the diffusion samplers were being tested, and the laboratory results were encouraging. He explained that the membrane used in the samplers will allow RDX to pass through and be collected. He stated that a line of diffusion samplers were installed beneath the pond bottom of Snake Pond this past Friday. The samplers will be in place for approximately two to three weeks and then will be retrieved and analyzed for explosives. Mr. Gregson said that he will report to the IART as soon as the results become available.

PLM Update

Mr. Gregson stated that the results from the extractable petroleum hydrocarbon testing are not yet available, but he hopes to be able to report on them by the next IART meeting.

Buried Tank

Mr. Gregson stated that the buried tank is an Army tank, and he is awaiting soil samples results from that location. Mr. Borci noted that the tank is located between MW-58 and MW-136.

Mr. Hugus inquired about the disagreement between the Guard and the EPA as to whether to conduct a radiation survey on the tank. Mr. Gregson explained that the disagreement pertained more to the scope of this type of investigation and when they should be conducted. He said that the Guard conducted a rough scan using a Geiger counter, which has not detected anything.

Mr. Hugus asked about protocol for further DU investigations. Mr. Gregson replied that the tank was examined for any evidence of penetration holes that would cause suspicion about DU use, but none were found. He stated that EPA has pictures showing testing by Textron on a tank, which lead the agencies to believe that the vehicle should be screened. However, the Geiger counter did not detect any gross evidence of excess radiation. Ms. Dolan stated that the Guard is working on a proposal to identify the characteristics of other areas that may have potential radiation. Mr. Hugus stated that he does not want to see potential DU areas dropped because the Guard and EPA can not agree on protocol. Ms. Dolan assured Mr. Hugus that that is not happening.

Contained Detonation Chamber

Mr. Hugus asked about the status of the controlled detonation chamber (CDC). Mr. Gregson said that approximately 1,700 items have been destroyed, and the stockpile has been depleted. The CDC has been shut down and the crew immobilized until a stockpile is created.

CS-19

Mr. Hugus stated that well 58-18A had a detection of 2,6-DNT at 30 times the MCL, and he therefore questioned why the IRP is objecting to the installation of a second well. He asked if CS-19 could be added to the agenda for the September IART meeting. Mr. Aker explained that the last well that was drilled had RDX at a fairly significant depth, but it was below the health advisory. He said that a screen was set at the RDX and that he believes that the leading edge of the plume is defined. Mr. Hugus agreed with Mr. Aker regarding the RDX, but noted that DNT also was detected, which is another problem, and the extent of that contamination is not known. Mr. Aker stated that he can make a CS-19 presentation to the IART after he makes a CS-19 presentation to the Plume Cleanup Team (PCT).

IART Tour

Ms. Dolan invited the team members on an updated driving tour of the Impact Area and the training ranges, which will include Demo Area 1, HUTA, and the CDC. She asked that team members fill out the tour survey at the end of the meeting or by September 10, 2001 at the latest.

Other

Mr. Schlesinger stated that the detection maps depict so many validated detections that they seem to be just a lot of data, and not real information. He suggested that perhaps chloroform detections should be removed from the maps, in order to clear up some space. Mr. Jasinski suggested that the technical team address this concern.

Agenda Item #8. Agenda Planning & Review Action Items

Agenda Planning

Mr. Jasinski said that future agenda items for the September IART meeting include, the HUTA scope of work, a PLM update, and Snake Pond diffusion sampling results (if available). A CS-19 update is scheduled for the October meeting. Mr. Hugus asked about the small arms ranges and whether the Guard intends to conduct more studies. Mr. Jasinski replied that he believes this issue will be discussed at the October IART meeting.

Mr. Cambareri stated that Governor Swift is supposed to come out with a management strategy at the end of September, and wondered if this subject could be discussed at the September meeting instead. Mr. Schlesinger asked if the IART has sent anything official to the Governor's office to ensure she is getting the right information. Mr. Jasinski said that he does not think that the team has sent anything, but that Mr. Dow has been acting as a conduit to the Governor's office. Mr. Jasinski suggested that individual team members contact the Governor's office with comments and concerns. Mr. Pinaud stated that DEP is in communication with the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), which is DEP's conduit to the Governor's office.

Action Items:

1. The Guard will respond to Mr. Dow's question regarding detections of vanadium and antimony mentioned in the Phase IIb Report.

2. The Guard will provide the team with a copy of validated results concerning Cleared Area 1 in the Phase IIb Report.

3. The Guard will provide the "Fate and Transport" laboratory study report (due this month) to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) representatives involved with the IART.

4. At the next IART meeting the Guard will provide a water level survey overlay on the Central Impact Area Aerial Magnetometry data map.

5. Ms. Pepin requests that general handout maps be updated.

Status of Action Items

Agenda Item #9. Adjourn

Mr. Jasinski announced that the next IART meeting is scheduled for September 25, 2001. He thanked everyone for attending and adjourned the meeting at 9:29 p.m.