Area Review Team
Falmouth Holiday Inn
August 28, 2001
6:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.
Handouts Distributed at Meeting:
1. August 28, 2001 Draft Meeting
2. July 24, 2001 Draft Action Items
3. July 24, 2001 Draft Meeting Minutes
4. IAGWSP Tour Information
5. Rapid Response Action - Mortar Target 9 Update
6. Screening Values and Standards for Detected Compounds in Soil
7. Snake Pond Diffusion Sampling Update
8. DRAFT: UXO Discoveries/Dispositions Since 07-24-01
9. USACE Information Paper re: Former H Range
10. Groundwater Study Update - IART Briefing 8/28/01
11. Presentation handout: Investigation Update
12. Presentation handout: CS-18 (Gun Position 9) Supplemental Site
13. Presentation handout: Phase IIb Report
14. Presentation handout: Central Impact Area Soil Report
Agenda Item #1. Welcome,
Approval of July 24, 2001 Meeting Minutes, Review Draft
Mr. Jasinski convened the meeting
at 6:02 p.m. He announced that he is facilitating tonight's meeting
because Mr. Jim Murphy is on vacation. The team members introduced
themselves. Mr. Jasinski noted that both Ms. Pepin and Ms. Hayes
were approved for Impact Area Review Team (IART) membership and
he welcomed them to the team.
Mr. Jasinski asked if there were
any changes to be made to the July 24, 2001 meeting minutes. Mr.
Hugus referred to page 9 of the minutes and stated that the discussion
regarding depleted uranium (DU) did not accurately reflect what
he, Dr. Feigenbaum, and Mr. James Kinney stated. He said that he
would like to see a paragraph added that addresses the fact that
levels of DU were detected at twice the background, and therefore
he, Dr. Feigenbaum, and Mr. Kinney believe that further investigation
Mr. Gregson referred to the second
paragraph from the bottom on page 8 and noted that "DU shave
charges" should read "DU shape charges." He noted
that the second paragraph on page 10 should read "popper"
kettle instead of "copper kettle." He also stated that
additional data is missing from the same paragraph, and said that
he would pass the information on to Ms. DeBaggis to include with
the changes. He then noted that di-n-butyl phthalate is misspelled
under the J Range investigation discussion. He added that "fluorine"
should be "fluoranthene". Mr. Gregson next referred to
the first paragraph on page 11 and said that "E&RC"
should be "AEC" for Army Environmental Center. Mr. Jasinski
asked if there were any more changes to the minutes, and hearing
none, he noted that the minutes were approved with the changes.
Mr. Jasinski reviewed the agenda
and noted that Mr. Judge will address the team regarding his potential
Agenda Item #2. Review Action
Mr. Jasinski referred to Action
Item #2 and noted that the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), the Joint Program Office (JPO), the Impact Area Groundwater
Study Program (IAGWSP), and the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health (MDPH) have incorporated the IART's comments into a revised
Snake Pond posting. The comments were sent to Mr. Dave Mason at
the Sandwich Board of Health, who has the final say regarding re-posting
the pond. Mr. Hugus asked for a copy of the letter. Mr. Jasinski
said that a copy of the letter and the posting will be included
in the next weekly IART mailing.
Mr. Hugus noted that the action
item indicates that the agencies will discuss updating the Snake
Pond posting. He said that he and other team members did not express
concern about updating the posting, but rather they felt that it
was misleading to the public because modeling indicates that Royal
Demolition Explosive (RDX) would be upwelling into Snake Pond approximately
250 feet downgradient of the spit in the pond. He stated that swimming
season is almost over and he faults the agencies - especially MDPH
- for not addressing this issue sooner.
Mr. Judge's Remarks
Mr. Jasinski asked Mr. Judge to
please address the team.
Mr. Judge stated that he is a Sandwich
Selectman and a member of the Senior Management Board (SMB). He
said that he thinks his membership on the IART would be a "nice
fit" and that he could serve as a liaison between the SMB and
the IART. He stated that he is extremely concerned about the health
and welfare of the citizens of Cape Cod and thinks that the IART
is where " the rubber hits the road."
Mr. Schlesinger asked Mr. Judge
if he will represent the Town of Sandwich as an IART member. Mr.
Judge stated that he will serve as a citizen on the IART and does
not intend to represent the citizens of Sandwich or the members
of the SMB, unless directed to do so.
Mr. Jasinski asked team members
to submit any questions or comments regarding Mr. Judge's potential
membership to Mr. Murphy by Friday, August 31, 2001.
At this time Mr. Cambareri asked
that an update on petroleum-like materials (PLM) be added to the
agenda under "Other Issues." Mr. Hugus asked that updates
also be provided on the H Range, the buried tank found at the J
Range, Chemical Spill 19 (CS-19), the Snake Pond diffusion samplers,
and the contained detonation chamber (CDC) under "Other Issues."
Mr. Jasinski added these items to the agenda.
Agenda Item #3. Phase IIb Report
Mr. Gregson reported that the Phase
IIb Report addresses 14 sites, including small arms ranges, training
areas, and other sites, which were identified by EPA for investigation.
He noted that the Guard recommended no further action at eight sites,
but six sites do require some level of additional investigation.
He asked team members to provide comments on the report to him by
September 11, 2001.
Mr. Gregson stated that most of
the 350 soil samples were collected from surface to two feet below
surface. Approximately 20% of the samples were analyzed for the
entire sweep of Phase I analytes, which includes volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), semi-volatile organic compounds, explosives (SVOCs),
metals, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
and ethylene dibromide (EDB). He noted that five monitoring wells
were installed as part of the Phase IIb investigation.
Inactive Demo Sites
Mr. Gregson first referred to findings
at the inactive demolition sites. He displayed a map depicting the
location of the sites, which are on the west central side of the
base. He stated that 13 samples were collected from two grids in
this location and there were no detections of any compounds above
background or the preliminary remediation goals. He reported that
two wells, monitoring wells 150 (MW-150) and MW-151, were installed
immediately downgradient of the demo sites and there were no detections
of explosives in the groundwater samples. However, thallium was
detected at 2.2 parts per billion (ppb) in the shallow screen at
MW-150. He noted that this was the only constituent detected above
maximum containment level (MCL) or health advisory. The health advisory
for thallium is 2 ppb. Mr. Gregson stated that the Guard recommends
that the groundwater in this area should continue to be monitored.
He added that the Guard also intends to seek more information, through
the archive search process, on the nature of activities at these
inactive demolition sites. He said that there is little information
on these sites other than the 1940s-era map, which depicts them
as demolition sites.
Mr. Schlesinger referred to page
68 of technical team memorandum 01-13 on the Central Impact Area
Soil Report. He said that an article by Jenkins is referenced, which
suggests that method 8330 may not capture the full range of concentrations
of explosives at artillery and mortar ranges. He asked why method
8330 was used if it in fact does not capture the full range of explosives.
Mr. Gregson stated that the Guard is looking into this matter. Mr.
Borci explained that method 8330 has been expanded to include 19
explosive compounds, and it addresses just about everything that
could have possibly been used at these sites. He added that other
methods may be considered because the detection limit may need to
Mr. Hugus asked if there were no
single discreet detections of explosives. Mr. Gregson replied that
both discreet and composite samples were collected and all were
nondetect for explosives. Mr. Hugus explained that his question
is relevant to the Central Impact Area Soil Report where contaminants
were dropped as contaminants of concern (COCs) based on composite
samples. He said that he thinks that averaging screens out individual
detections. Mr. Gregson stated that the results he is reporting
have not yet gone through the COC process.
Former C Range
Mr. Gregson stated that the former
C Range is one of the three unbermed small arms ranges that were
evaluated under the Phase IIb program. This particular range is
located on the north side of Frank Perkins Road, near training area
BA7, and it was used in the 1940s as a machine gun range. He reported
that 40 samples were collected at 18 locations along the firing
line and the natural backstop that exists on the east side of the
range. The soil results showed no detections of propellant compounds
along the firing line. However, metal detections, predominately
lead, were found above screening criteria in 10 out of 27 samples
collected from the backstop. Lead also was detected at 5 out of
13 samples collected at the firing point. He reported that lead
levels exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching process (TCLP)
hazardous waste threshold of 5 parts per million (ppm) in three
of the samples, which were collected from shallow soil. The deeper
samples did not exceed the 5 ppm TCLP screening level.
Mr. Gregson reported that the recommendation
for the former C Range is further evaluation of the levels of metals
and removal of the soils, if needed.
Ms. Adams said that she thought
the TCLP for lead had changed and is now 0.75 ppm. Mr. Gregson explained
that 0.75 ppm is the uniform treatment standard, as opposed to the
standard that differentiates between a hazardous versus a non-hazardous
material. The former standard is the one that has to be met for
the soil to be disposed at an unlined landfill. Ms. Adams said that
she thinks this is relevant for the purpose of cleanup. Mr. Gregson
stated that the Guard and EPA agreed to disagree on this point regarding
the lead berm project, though the standard was met on that particular
project. Ms. Adams said that it is EPA's point of view that 0.75
ppm is the relevant standard.
Former D Range
Mr. Gregson stated that the former
D Range also was included in the Phase IIb investigation. It is
located near Pine Hill up by Range Control in the western part of
the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). He reported that former
D Range was also used since the 1940s for rifle, pistol, and machine
Mr. Gregson reported that 35 soil
samples were collected from 13 locations along the firing line to
the southwest, and from the backstop to the northeast. He stated
that MW-174 was installed at the downgradient edge at the backstop.
The propellant compound n-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected in firing
line samples, at levels below the MMR preliminary remediation goal
(PRG). There were also detections of metals, including antimony,
copper, and lead; these were above screening criteria in samples
from the backstop. There were also detections of lead at levels
above the leachability criteria of 5 ppb. Mr. Gregson reported that
thallium was detected in the groundwater sample from MW-174. He
noted that the detection was 2.4 ppb, but the sample result currently
Mr. Gregson stated that recommendations
for the former D Range are further evaluation of the conditions
found at the target berm where the detections of lead were the highest,
and continued monitoring at MW-174.
Dr. Feigenbaum asked what was fired
at the range. Mr. Gregson replied that he does not have the particulars
on the rounds, but that rifles, pistols, and machine guns were fired
at the range. Dr. Feigenbaum asked when the range was last used.
Mr. Grant stated that he believes the range was last used in 1961.
Dr. Feigenbaum pointed out that the contamination has persisted
since 1961. Mr. Gregson concurred and said that metals in particular
are still found in the berm 40 years later.
Mr. Hugus asked why MW-174 is located
in the middle of what might be a source area, rather than 40 years
downgradient. Mr. Gregson explained that metals and lead are not
expected to be in the water table within that timeframe. He said
that he thinks the well is situated in a good spot to catch any
contamination on its way to the water table. Mr. Hugus said he thinks
this might be true with regard to lead, but he questioned whether
other propellants might have leached into the groundwater and are
now downgradient of MW-174. Mr. Gregson replied that small arms
were fired at this location, and therefore it is not likely that
propellants would be found at the target berm. Mr. Hugus said that
was not true at the Golf and India Ranges. Mr. Gregson pointed out
that the investigation there looked at the firing line as opposed
to the target berms themselves. He added that there was a detection
of n-nitrosodiphenylamine at the firing line at the former D Range.
Mr. Hugus asked why a well has
not been installed downgradient of the firing line. Mr. Gregson
replied that the well location was chosen based on soil data indicating
the highest levels of contaminants at this particular range. He
explained that the highest detection was 160 ppm of n-nitrosodiphenylamine,
which is below the PRG.
Dr. Feigenbaum stated that he thinks
this is a good place to start the investigation, not stop it. He
agreed with Mr. Hugus's opinion that wells should be installed downgradient.
Mr. Grant stated that the range actually was last used in the 1980s.
Mr. Cambareri also agreed that a well should be installed downgradient
of the firing point, rather than the berm.
Mr. Borci stated that the Phase
IIb workplan was well under way when the first results from the
current small arms ranges were received. The firing point locations
at the older ranges were added at the last minute. He said that
the plan included installation of monitoring wells in locations
with the highest detections of lead and TCLP lead in soils. He explained
that future decisions will be made based on the data in the report,
and information regarding newer ranges.
Cleared Area 1
Mr. Gregson next referred to the
Cleared Area, which is located in the northwest part of the Impact
Area. He noted that 17 samples were collected from two locations
in this area, and reported that 2A-dinitrotoluene (2A-DNT) was detected
in one sample at 180 ppb. There were also detections of aluminum,
antimony, iron, manganese, and vanadium at levels above the screening
criteria. He said that the most unexpected detection was of trichloroethylene
(TCE), which was found in six of the samples, with a maximum detection
of 13 ppb.
Mr. Gregson said that recommendations
for this site include a supplemental site inspection and some additional
characterization of the area.
Dr. Feigenbaum asked what 4A-DNT
is. Mr. Gregson explained that it is a breakdown product of trinitrotoluene
(TNT). Mr. Jasinski stated that the team members will be provided
with chemistry ring diagrams depicting 4A-DNT and other related
Mr. Dow asked where the vanadium
and antimony comes from in the rounds. Mr. Gregson said that he
will find out and report back to the team.
Mr. Hugus asked whether the TCE
detection is validated. Mr. Grant confirmed that it is not. Mr.
Gregson pointed out that TCE was detected in six samples, and noted
that it is unusual to detect TCE in surface soil 40 years later.
He stated that the supplemental site inspection will focus on the
Mr. Gregson stated that the GN-2
grenade court is located on the north side of Howe Road, near the
intersection of Frank Perkins Road. He reported that this area was
used in the 1950s for practice with hand grenades and high explosive
(HE) fragmentation grenades. This same area is also the location
of gun position 11 (GP-11).
Mr. Gregson reported that 21 samples
were collected from seven locations at the target base and the debris
piles within the wooded area north of GP-11. Ethyl-centralite was
detected at 325 ppb, and 2,4-DNT was detected at a maximum of 2.9
ppb. There were also detections of 4-nitrophenol, di-n-butyl phthalate,
and n-nitrosodiphenylamine. He noted that the detections were located
close to the firing position. He said that further characterization
of this area will be carried out as part of the gun position assessment.
Mr. Gregson reported that the GA/GB
Ranges were used as known distance rifle ranges in the 1940s. Significant
features that were noted during the site reconnaissance include
a soil berm observed with bullet fragments, an east-west drainage
ditch, former firing lines, and a coal ash and slag pile along the
100-yard firing line of the GA Range.
Mr. Gregson reported that 69 samples
were collected from 25 locations. He stated that there were exceedances
of lead and manganese in the berm samples. The screening criteria
was exceeded for metals in the 25 drainage ditch samples specifically
for aluminum, antimony, arsenic, cadmium, iron, lead, manganese,
and vanadium. There were also detections of polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs) and one of the PCB aroclors. Propellant and
explosive compounds detected in one sample include nitroglycerine
and pentaerythitol tetranitrate (PETN). He added that 2,4-DNT and
di-n-butyl phthalate were detected in the sample from grid 143.
Mr. Gregson also reported that
23 firing line samples were collected and antimony was detected
in five samples, aluminum in two samples, and iron in three samples,
all above the screening criteria. In addition, the pesticide dieldrin
was detected above criteria. He stated that there were also detections
of 2,4-DNT, 4-nitrophenol, and n-nitrosodiphenylamine in sample
Mr. Gregson stated that the recommendations
for this area include the removal of impacted sediments from the
drainage ditch, and a look at the design of the storm water discharge
Mr. Hugus said that he is interested
in knowing the specific levels of contaminants that were detected.
He noted that it is not necessarily helpful to know that detections
are above screening criteria without knowing by how much. Dr. Feigenbaum
agreed with Mr. Hugus and requested that detection information include
the actual level and the screening criteria. Mr. Gregson said that
perhaps he could create a table reflecting the requested information.
Ms. Hayes asked how long this study
has been going on and approximately how much money it has cost.
Mr. Gregson replied that he has been working on the Phase IIb investigation
for eight months and the cost of the investigation is approximately
2 to 3 million dollars at this point.
Small Arms Ranges Investigation
Mr. Gregson reminded the team members
that soil sampling and air monitoring were conducted at the end
of last year at some of the small arms ranges, including Sierra
East (SE), I, and G Ranges. The small arms ranges were selected
based on recent use as well as long-term duration of relatively
high use. Discreet samples were collected from nine point grids
located along the firing lines at each range. A total of 35 samples
were analyzed for metals and SVOCs.
Mr. Gregson reported that results
from the Phase IIb investigation were similar to those from the
previous soil-sampling event. N-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected
in 26 samples, di-n-butyl phthalate was detected in 22 samples,
2,4-DNT was detected in 13 samples, n-nitrosodiphenylamine was detected
in seven samples, ethyl-centralite was detected in three samples,
and 2,6-DNT was detected in one sample. Mr. Gregson stated that
the 2,4-DNT detection is the only one to exceed the MMR PRG. Propellants
were detected at both the former ranges and the more recently used
ranges. Mr. Gregson stated that lead was detected in 12 of 32 samples
at G Range and I Range, and antimony was detected in four samples
at the G and SE Ranges. Lead was detected above criteria in the
former C Range, and antimony was seen at the GA and GB Ranges.
Mr. Gregson reported that the next
step is to attempt to characterize any impacts to groundwater. He
reported that today he received an emissions study from the Army
Environmental Center (AEC) for the 5.56 round, which were the same
kind of rounds used at these three ranges. The study will help to
determine whether, for instance, the 2,4-DNT detections are a result
of the small arms weapons systems or from previous activities.
Mr. Schlesinger asked where the
2,4-DNT detections were located. Mr. Gregson replied that 2,4-DNT
was detected in the G Range. Mr. Schlesinger asked Mr. Gregson if
ranges that are currently in use have similar detections. Mr. Gregson
replied that he anticipated that these compounds would be detected
at other ranges, but probably at lower concentrations if the ranges
had lower historic use. He added that these ranges continue to be
Dr. Feigenbaum said that he thought
studies were going to continue at the small arms ranges. Mr. Borci
explained that future follow-up will in part be determined based
on the information contained in the AEC emissions report, which
was received today. Dr. Feigenbaum stated that contaminants seem
to be found at all the small arms ranges, and he noted that the
same propellant is being used in the green ammunitions. Mr. Gregson
said that the AEC report cited that fewer compounds were detected
in the green ammo. Dr. Feigenbaum said that he does not trust reports
generated by the AEC because, he doesn't believe it is a disinterested
party. Mr. Hugus stated that he does not trust the AEC. He said
that he thinks the whole project has been dragged out because the
Guard wants to continue firing at the ranges. He said that the ranges
that are currently used have fresh DNT in their soil, which means
the firing is bad for the environment and should be stopped. He
asked the regulators to act on this issue. Mr. Gregson reported
that he will make copies of the AEC report available to team members.
Ms. Pepin stated that she has not
received copies of the technical memoranda. Mr. Gregson said that
he will send her copies of the referenced documents and make sure
she is on the mailing list.
Mr. Dow stated that the final Environmental
Impact Report (EIR) failed to define compatible training, and it
claimed that most of the pollution in the northern 15,000 acres
occurred before 1980. He encouraged EPA to proceed posthaste in
the event that contamination is occurring at currently used ranges.
Mr. Dow also stated that he thinks that the detection of thallium
is an unresolved problem that warrants further investigation.
Agenda Item #4. Central Impact
Area Soil Report
Mr. Gregson stated that the Central
Impact Area (CIA) Soil Report focuses on identified COC for the
soil at the CIA and also addresses the distribution, nature, and
extent of the compounds detected. He noted that the CIA is located
in the central portion of Camp Edwards and consists of approximately
Mr. Gregson stated that targets
sampled in the CIA included, tanks, armored personnel carriers,
cars, and buoys. He also noted that munitions used prior to World
War II contained primarily TNT, whereas post World War II munitions
are comprised of a mixture of RDX and TNT.
Mr. Gregson reported that over
2000 soil samples were collected at 279 locations, including 36
targets in the CIA. Samples were also taken from boreholes and from
craters created by blow-in-place activities. He explained that COCs
were identified using two scenarios; the potential for compounds
to leach into groundwater, and the health risk imposed by ingestion
or direct contact. Six explosive compounds and TNT breakdown products
were identified as COCs.
Mr. Gregson stated that contaminants
primarily were found from surface to the first foot of soil. No
COCs were detected below two feet in any of the borehole samples,
and in general the highest concentrations were found within 20 feet
of the targets. He stated that RDX was the most frequently detected
Mr. Gregson stated that soil data
indicate that the distribution of explosives is heterogeneous, and
concentrations decrease rapidly with depth. He explained that the
distribution suggests that explosions of munitions near targets
resulted in deposition of explosives, particularly on the ground
surface over a fairly extensive area.
Mr. Gregson stated that a significant
portion of the target sampling is yet to be completed. There are
13 targets that remain to be characterized. He said that Phase II
of the high use target area (HUTA) will also ensue; this will focus
on collecting data to learn more about the distribution of explosive
compounds and unexploded ordnance (UXO) extending out from the target.
He added that investigations will also be conducted near the targets
for polychlorinated naphthalene compounds. Future investigations
will also include collecting data on physical parameters, organic
carbon, and pH to help with modeling. He added that this is all
leading to the development and initial screening of alternatives
for remediation of the soil.
Mr. Schlesinger stated that he
thinks the draft Phase I report was a farce and it is wrong to say
that the concentrations of explosives found in groundwater were
not high enough to identify any significant soil contamination.
He then referred to page 5 of the CIA Soil Report technical memorandum
which states, "no explosives were detected in any of the soil
samples using method 8830," but which fails to mention whether
explosives were detected using other methods. He noted that on page
20 there is a reference to a fate and transport report due in August
2001, and asked if that report is in fact available.
Mr. Gregson replied that the data
to which Mr. Schlesinger referred to are not in report form at this
point. However, the data are being used for modeling at Demo Area
1 and the CIA. Mr. Schlesinger requested that a copy of the data
be forwarded to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
representatives on the IART. Mr. Schlesinger requested a copy of
the Jenkins article referenced on page 68 of the document.
Mr. Hugus said that he is interested
in hearing from EPA regarding the method used to identify the six
COCs. He said that he thinks using composite samples and arithmetically
averaging samples allows for any contaminant to be ruled out as
a COC. Mr. Borci stated that EPA has directed the Guard to use the
highest concentration in the composite examples. He said that EPA
will continue to evaluate the COCs.
Mr. Hugus said that he is pleased
to see that the Guard, on page 141 of the report, concludes that
"the data does not support the hypothesis of there being an
unidentified cache of UXO, rather the various data sources all point
to a non-point source term extending over a wide spatial area. The
pattern of groundwater contamination and soil contamination is consistent
with the wide distribution of explosive particulates deposited on
the surface of the soil." And it ends by saying, "groundwater
has been impacted by explosives by military training activity."
Mr. Hugus stated that this admission puts to rest an ongoing debate.
Mr. Hugus also said that it would
be helpful if EPA's and DEP's comments were available to the team
members to review before their own comments were due to be submitted.
Mr. Borci said that EPA is working on that, but sometimes it's a
matter of scheduling and deadlines.
Mr. Cambareri requested that the
Guard provide a water level survey overlay on the Central Impact
Area Aerial Magnetometry data map.
Agenda Item #5. CS-18 Update
Mr. Aker explained that CS-18 is
also known as GP-9. He said that GP-9 was used for firing field
artillery into the Impact Area, which occurred from World War II
until all artillery firing was shut down.
Mr. Aker stated that in 1994 the
Army conducted a site inspection at the site, at which point 18
soil locations and four background locations were sampled. He reported
that 2,4-DNT and 2,6-DNT were found in the majority of the surface
soil samples. Four monitoring wells were installed to the water
table, which were nondetect for any contaminants.
Mr. Aker stated that the objective
for the CS-18 supplemental site inspection was to further determine
the nature and extent of soil contamination and groundwater contamination,
and to form a preliminary risk evaluation (PRE). The decision point
is scheduled for December, at which time it will be determined whether
a decision document, remedial investigation, or an engineering evaluation
and cost analysis (EE/CA) will be implemented.
Mr. Aker displayed a map of CS-18
and pointed out the various locations where samples were taken,
both past and current. He also pointed out MW-5 and MW-6. He noted
that a five-star pattern was used for sampling. The five locations
were sampled and were then composited. Sampling occurred at two
intervals; zero to six inches, and 18 to 24 inches. He said that
2,4-DNT and 2,6-DNT was pretty widespread throughout the site, and
mostly detected in the first foot and a half.
Mr. Aker reported that chlorinated
hydrocarbon solvents were detected during groundwater screen drilling.
He said that tetrachloroethylene (PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE)
were found riding on the top of the silt layer at approximately
170 feet. He explained that the screen was set at the top of the
silt layer in MW-5, which had detections of 2.5 ppb for PCE and
2.7 ppb for TCE. Measurable concentrations of metals were detected
in all monitoring wells, including aluminum, calcium, cobalt, magnesium,
sodium, zinc, barium, chromium, iron, manganese, and vanadium. Mr.
Aker stated that the risk screening currently under way will be
followed by recommendations for the future.
Mr. Aker then displayed maps depicting
the 1994 investigation and the current effort, and noted that the
contour has changed slightly.
Mr. Hugus inquired about the history
the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) has concerning CS-18.
Mr. Aker replied that DNT was first discovered during a Center for
Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) investigation in
1994. However, he believes that CS-18 itself was identified in 1992.
Mr. Hugus stated that the IRP has known about CS-18 since 1992 and
has a remedial action milestone scheduled for 2003. He stated that
he thinks nine years is too long to take action on DNT in the soil
at this site.
Mr. Cambareri asked how confident
Mr. Aker is that MW-2 and MW-1 are located downgradient of the highest
DNT concentrations. Mr. Aker replied that these locations were selected
based on information from the four initial wells installed by the
Agenda Item #6. Investigations
Mr. Gregson reported that there
were only a few detections of explosives in groundwater samples
from wells that were previously clean or newly detected. There was
a detection of RDX at 0.38 ppb in MW-18; however, this detection
has not yet been validated. The samples collected from MW-173, which
is downgradient of Demo Area 1, were nondetect. However, MW-175,
which is located just north of MW-173 had several explosive detections,
which may be due to interference from contaminants on the drilling
equipment. He reported that the third well, D1P8, is proposed to
be drilled just to the north of MW-175, and will probably be installed
early this fall.
Mr. Gregson reported that perchlorate
was previously detected at MW-13D, which is located north of the
J-3 Range. He noted that a laboratory error was uncovered and it
now appears that that well should have been nondetect. Mr. Gregson
stated that perchlorate was detected in MW-163 at 67 ppb. He said
that this is the highest concentration detected in this vicinity
of MMR, and it exceeds other detections at the J Ranges by an order
of magnitude. There is also a detection of perchlorate of 6 ppb
in MW-145M1. He added that there is also an unvalidated perchlorate
detection in Demo Area 1.
Mr. Hugus said that he thinks MW-175,
which is believed to have had interference in the sample, is way
off track from Demo Area 1, and the obvious track would be farther
south. Mr. Gregson said that it appears that the Demo Area 1 plume
takes a significant bend to the north. Mr. Hugus stated that the
modeling at Demo Area 1 has been problematic, and he thinks that
the wells should be further to the south, not the north. Mr. Borci
explained that the Guard's latest modeling indicates that it is
likely that wells 175 and D1P8 are actually in the core of the plume,
if it has migrated out that far. Mr. Jasinski suggested that the
Guard provide a better, more updated map to accurately depict the
Mr. Hugus asked about the status
of delineating a plume for the J Range detections. Mr. Gregson replied
that additional data are being collected from the J Ranges. Mr.
Hugus encouraged the Guard to depict a plume shell around the detections.
Ms. Dolan pointed out that the J Range report is scheduled for submission
on September 5, 2001, and the Guard is going to submit an initial
delineation of the plume by September 16, 2001. Mr. Gregson stated
that the J Ranges are by far the most complicated areas under investigation.
Ms. Pepin requested an updated
map depicting the J Ranges, Demo Area 1, and the Central Impact
Area. Mr. Gregson said those areas can be incorporated into a base
Agenda Item #7. Other Issues
Former H Range
Mr. Hugus said that the handout
concerning the former H Range, does not mention the HE mortar round
that was found on Camp Good News property. Mr. Gregson read from
the handout, "Two unexploded ordnances were uncovered and were
blown-in-place on August 16. One anomaly was located on MMR property.
The second anomaly was located about 50 feet off MMR, on private
property." Mr. Hugus stated it does not say that HE rounds
were found on Camp Good News, which is used recreationally. Mr.
Gregson said that the Army Corps is working closely with the owners
of Camp Good News. Also, the former H Range was formerly used as
a defense site, so it is not an unusual find.
Snake Pond Diffusion Sampler
Mr. Gregson stated that he reported
at the last IART meeting that the diffusion samplers were being
tested, and the laboratory results were encouraging. He explained
that the membrane used in the samplers will allow RDX to pass through
and be collected. He stated that a line of diffusion samplers were
installed beneath the pond bottom of Snake Pond this past Friday.
The samplers will be in place for approximately two to three weeks
and then will be retrieved and analyzed for explosives. Mr. Gregson
said that he will report to the IART as soon as the results become
Mr. Gregson stated that the results
from the extractable petroleum hydrocarbon testing are not yet available,
but he hopes to be able to report on them by the next IART meeting.
Mr. Gregson stated that the buried
tank is an Army tank, and he is awaiting soil samples results from
that location. Mr. Borci noted that the tank is located between
MW-58 and MW-136.
Mr. Hugus inquired about the disagreement
between the Guard and the EPA as to whether to conduct a radiation
survey on the tank. Mr. Gregson explained that the disagreement
pertained more to the scope of this type of investigation and when
they should be conducted. He said that the Guard conducted a rough
scan using a Geiger counter, which has not detected anything.
Mr. Hugus asked about protocol
for further DU investigations. Mr. Gregson replied that the tank
was examined for any evidence of penetration holes that would cause
suspicion about DU use, but none were found. He stated that EPA
has pictures showing testing by Textron on a tank, which lead the
agencies to believe that the vehicle should be screened. However,
the Geiger counter did not detect any gross evidence of excess radiation.
Ms. Dolan stated that the Guard is working on a proposal to identify
the characteristics of other areas that may have potential radiation.
Mr. Hugus stated that he does not want to see potential DU areas
dropped because the Guard and EPA can not agree on protocol. Ms.
Dolan assured Mr. Hugus that that is not happening.
Contained Detonation Chamber
Mr. Hugus asked about the status
of the controlled detonation chamber (CDC). Mr. Gregson said that
approximately 1,700 items have been destroyed, and the stockpile
has been depleted. The CDC has been shut down and the crew immobilized
until a stockpile is created.
Mr. Hugus stated that well 58-18A
had a detection of 2,6-DNT at 30 times the MCL, and he therefore
questioned why the IRP is objecting to the installation of a second
well. He asked if CS-19 could be added to the agenda for the September
IART meeting. Mr. Aker explained that the last well that was drilled
had RDX at a fairly significant depth, but it was below the health
advisory. He said that a screen was set at the RDX and that he believes
that the leading edge of the plume is defined. Mr. Hugus agreed
with Mr. Aker regarding the RDX, but noted that DNT also was detected,
which is another problem, and the extent of that contamination is
not known. Mr. Aker stated that he can make a CS-19 presentation
to the IART after he makes a CS-19 presentation to the Plume Cleanup
Ms. Dolan invited the team members
on an updated driving tour of the Impact Area and the training ranges,
which will include Demo Area 1, HUTA, and the CDC. She asked that
team members fill out the tour survey at the end of the meeting
or by September 10, 2001 at the latest.
Mr. Schlesinger stated that the
detection maps depict so many validated detections that they seem
to be just a lot of data, and not real information. He suggested
that perhaps chloroform detections should be removed from the maps,
in order to clear up some space. Mr. Jasinski suggested that the
technical team address this concern.
Agenda Item #8. Agenda Planning
& Review Action Items
Mr. Jasinski said that future agenda
items for the September IART meeting include, the HUTA scope of
work, a PLM update, and Snake Pond diffusion sampling results (if
available). A CS-19 update is scheduled for the October meeting.
Mr. Hugus asked about the small arms ranges and whether the Guard
intends to conduct more studies. Mr. Jasinski replied that he believes
this issue will be discussed at the October IART meeting.
Mr. Cambareri stated that Governor
Swift is supposed to come out with a management strategy at the
end of September, and wondered if this subject could be discussed
at the September meeting instead. Mr. Schlesinger asked if the IART
has sent anything official to the Governor's office to ensure she
is getting the right information. Mr. Jasinski said that he does
not think that the team has sent anything, but that Mr. Dow has
been acting as a conduit to the Governor's office. Mr. Jasinski
suggested that individual team members contact the Governor's office
with comments and concerns. Mr. Pinaud stated that DEP is in communication
with the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA), which
is DEP's conduit to the Governor's office.
1. The Guard will respond to Mr.
Dow's question regarding detections of vanadium and antimony mentioned
in the Phase IIb Report.
2. The Guard will provide the team
with a copy of validated results concerning Cleared Area 1 in the
Phase IIb Report.
3. The Guard will provide the "Fate
and Transport" laboratory study report (due this month) to
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) representatives
involved with the IART.
4. At the next IART meeting the
Guard will provide a water level survey overlay on the Central Impact
Area Aerial Magnetometry data map.
5. Ms. Pepin requests that general
handout maps be updated.
of Action Items
Agenda Item #9. Adjourn
Mr. Jasinski announced that the
next IART meeting is scheduled for September 25, 2001. He thanked
everyone for attending and adjourned the meeting at 9:29 p.m.