Area Review Team
the King Parish
Distributed at Meeting:
2001 Draft Meeting Agenda
2001 Draft Action Items
2001 Draft Meeting Minutes
Study Update, IART Briefing 7/24/01
Since 06-26-01 IART
Groundwater Study Program General Fact Sheet
Magnetometry Results with RDX detections in the Central Impact
Findings, Massachusetts Military Reservation, June 2001
Handout: IAGWSP New Detects Update
Handout: Depleted Uranium Investigation at the J-1, J-3, and U
Handout: J Ranges Response Plan Update
Handout: Draft J1/J3/L Ranges Additional Delineation Work Plan
(J-1 1000m Berm and Petroleum-like Material)
Handout: Demo Area 1 Soil Screening of Alternatives
Uranium Investigations at the J-1. J-3, and U Ranges of the Massachusetts
Military Reservation, Draft Report, June 6, 2001
Item #1. Welcome, Approval of June 26, 2001 Meeting Minutes, and
Murphy convened the meeting at 6:15 p.m. and asked if there were
any changes to be made to the June 26, 2001 Impact Area Review Team
(IART) meeting minutes. Mr. Gregson stated that on page 11 the word
redux should be replaced with the word redox. No other
comments were offered and the minutes were approved with one change.
Mr. Murphy then asked the team members to introduce themselves.
Murphy reviewed the agenda and asked if there were any recommended
changes or additions. Mr. Hugus requested an update on the Small
Arms Ranges Investigation under "Other Issues." Mr. Murphy
Item #1. Review Action Items
Murphy reviewed the action items from the June 26, 2001 IART meeting.
requested that a copy of the Central Impact Area plume map overlaid
with Aerial Magnetometry (Air Mag) data as displayed at the June
26, 2001 IART, be distributed to the team.
Murphy noted that the map was included in the mailing and is on
the handout table at tonight’s meeting. Mr. Hugus asked why there
is a close correspondence between the detections shown in blue
and the Impact Area boundary. Mr. Gregson replied that it is a
function of how the air mag survey is conducted; when the helicopter
turns around near the Impact Area boundary. He explained that
those blue areas are not real magnetic anomalies, but have not
yet been screened out of the map.
Borci added that ongoing fieldwork includes examining detections
on the ground to determine whether or not they are real anomalies.
He said that part of the difficulty of air mag technology is the
screening of air mag data to make these determinations. Anomalies
that are not real are screened out of the air mag data, and the
current map has been screened once so far.
Hugus stated that he does not understand why the helicopter making
two passes over the Impact Area boundary would cause apparent
detections. Mr. Borci noted that the detections could include
a number of things such as utility lines and overlap of other
ranges. He also said that he would look into providing the team
with a technical answer to this question from Tetra Tech.
requested that the attendance list from the Impact Area Groundwater
Study Program (IAGWSP) weekly technical meetings be distributed
along with the meeting minutes in e-mail.
Murphy noted that the attendance list is now included in the
weekly progress reports.
will incorporate comments made to the draft IART groundrules and
distribute the revised draft IART groundrules to the team.
Murphy stated that the IART groundrules were sent in the mailing
and are available at the handout table at tonight’s meeting.
with the regulators, will incorporate comments made to the draft
general fact sheet and distribute the revised draft fact sheet
to the team.
Murphy noted that the revised draft fact sheet, which is available
for the team members tonight, will be printed soon after the
team’s final review.
requested that when documents are distributed to the team, that
the IAGWSP office provide the name of the contact person to submit
comments to and by what date the comments are due.
Murphy stated that comments should be sent via e-mail to Mr.
Gregson of the Impact Area Groundwater Study Program (IAGWSP),
with copies to Mr. Borci of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Mr. Pinaud of the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP).
requested an update on the status of the four people who have
expressed interest in joining the IART.
Murphy noted that this is an agenda item for tonight’s IART
requested that the Guard provide to the team what their intentions
are for the posting at Snake Pond.
Murphy noted that Snake Pond has been posted and a copy of the
posting was included in the mailing and is available as a handout
Hugus commented that he is glad the posting was done; however,
he believes that the posting itself is not accurate. He noted
that Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX), which was detected in
the well located at the spit in Snake Pond, is thought to be
upwelling about 250 feet downgradient of the spit, and the posting
does not state that. Ms. Dolan explained that the upwelling
is based on modeling, and surface water samples collected in
the northern cove of Snake Pond near the spit are nondetect
for explosives. She noted that the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) has developed diffusion samplers that will be
placed on the pond bottom in the northern cove of Snake Pond
and tested for RDX. Ms. Dolan added that Mr. Gregson will discuss
the diffusion samplers during the J Range Response Plan Update
on tonight’s agenda.
Hugus stated that although the upwelling of RDX is based on
modeling, he believes that the public should know about it.
He said that he thinks that the posting should incorporate what
the modeling predicts, that diffusion sampling is going to be
done, and what the results of the diffusion sampling are. Mr.
Mierz stated that surface water sampling is being conducted
biweekly from the beaches at Snake Pond, and results have been
Feigenbaum noted that the posting does not indicate that the
investigation has not been completed, and it gives no explanation
of explosives being probable carcinogens, which is the reason
for the posting in the first place. He said that he believes
that the posting should state that investigations are ongoing.
Pinaud noted that the citizen team members would like the posting
to include a statement that explosive contaminants are suspected
carcinogens, that the explosive compounds are likely to upwell
into the pond, and that the investigation is continuing. He
said that he has no problem adding these statements to the Snake
Pond posting, but is uncertain about the process. Mr. Mierz
stated that the posting was a joint effort undertaken by several
different agencies identified at the bottom of the posting.
Kinney stated that he does not believe that the posting is a
warning; he believes it is more of a reassurance. Even though
there are nondetects in surface water, the modeling shows that
contamination is upwelling, and he thinks that the posting should
identify the contaminants and the potential effects of exposure.
He said that he believes that the posting should include a statement
that the investigation is ongoing so that the public is made
aware of the potential hazards. Ms. Dolan noted that whenever
new data become available; the public is notified immediately
- whether the data are detect or nondetect.
Garcia-Surette commented that the public needs to be provided
with information that is factual, based on real live analytical
data and detections. While modeling is a great tool to help
steer the efforts of an investigation, it is easy for the public
to be misled or confused about what, in reality, could perhaps
be modeling. For a posting such as the Snake Pond posting, the
protocol has been to identify detections, and to her knowledge,
there was no deviation in the protocol for the Snake Pond posting.
Ms. Garcia-Surette also said that any information that is based
on modeling or potential exposure points, and is to be presented
to the public, would need to be carefully worded.
Kinney stated that if the purpose of the posting is to truly
warn the public, then the public needs the information. He acknowledged
that the information needs to be clearly identified, but stressed
that it must be available so that people can make their own
judgments. He noted that the modeling that shows possible upwelling
of plumes, the potential effects of the chemicals being discussed,
and the fact that there have been nondetects in surface water
are all pertinent pieces of information that he thinks should
be included in the posting.
Garcia-Surette stated that as long as the public understands
that modeling is used as a tool and is not reality, she is not
opposed to stating that modeling indicates possible upwelling.
She added that the important piece to understand is that the
agencies’ approach is to depend on real data, which is why the
USGS is gathering real data through the diffusion sampling effort.
Dow stated that the posting is warning about mercury levels
in the fish is too small and does not stand out against the
rest of the posting as a true warning. Mr. Mierz replied that
the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) has recommended
that the mercury advisory be printed in red or bold lettering
because it is the posting’s most important piece of information
at this time from a public health standpoint.
requested that the Guard check on the location of residential
wells on the southeastern end of Snake Pond.
Gregson noted that five wells have been sampled in that area,
and to date all samples are nondetect for explosives and perchlorate.
Murphy stated that the future agenda items are all on tonight’s
agenda with the exception of the update on Chemical Spill-18
(CS-18), which is tentatively on the agenda for the August IART
meeting, and the update on CS-19, which will be on either the
September or the October IART meeting agenda.
Item #3. Introductions of Potential New IART Members
Murphy noted that of the four people who had requested membership
to the IART, two are present at the meeting tonight to introduce
Hayes introduced herself as a resident of Yarmouthport. She noted
that she has an undergraduate degree from Boston College and a Masters
Degree in Nursing, also from Boston College. She said that she worked
for the United States Public Health Service in Panama and Alaska,
and then attended the Heller School for the Advancement of Social
Policy at Brandeis University where she majored in community organization
and the development of social policy. She then taught at the University
of Miami for ten years, moved to Cape Cod several years ago and
currently is writing a textbook. Ms. Hayes also mentioned that her
brother is a long-time resident of Bourne. She said that she has
reviewed the minutes from IART meetings, and she welcomed any questions
from the team.
Feigenbaum asked what kind of community organizing Ms. Hayes has
done. Ms. Hayes replied that while she was at Brandeis she did a
lot of work with the neighborhood health centers, and also was involved
with the "A" and "B" organizations under the
Dukakis administration. She further noted that her thesis at Brandeis
was deinstitutionalization, and that she taught about about health
when she lived in Panama and in Anchorage, Alaska.
Pepin, a Falmouth resident, introduced herself and read a letter
that she’d written to Mr. Borci, in which she’d noted that she has
been following Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR) issues and
attending IART meetings for the past two years. She said that her
credentials include recently receiving a Dean’s award from Suffolk
University Law School for advancing the civic and professional responsibility
of the legal profession by progressive academic research of issues
related to MMR. Ms. Pepin informed the team that she studied at
Suffolk University Law School, Suffolk University School of Management,
Harvard University, and Bristol Community College. She said that
she has worked as a legislative aide for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
and currently is a registered nurse. She also noted that she has
lived in Barnstable County for eleven years, and has owned a home
in Falmouth for seven years.
Hugus inquired about Ms. Pepin’s research of MMR issues. Ms. Pepin
replied that she wrote a paper on the Sandwich pipeline, as well
as a paper entitled "Difficulties on Obtaining Information
through State and Federal Agencies about the Massachusetts Military
Reservation: Freedom of Information Act Implications," which
she wrote a for a public policy course taught by Speaker of the
House Thomas Finneran.
Murphy stated that Mr. Dick Judge, a Sandwich Selectman and
member of the Senior Management Board, also is interested in becoming
a citizen member of the IART, but is not present at the meeting
to speak this evening. Mr. Murphy thanked Ms. Hayes and Ms. Pepin,
and asked the current IART members to send any recommendations to
him by Friday so that he could inform the EPA regional administrator,
who ultimately would appoint the new members.
Item #4. Demo Area 1 Soil Screening Report
Gregson stated that comments on the Demo Area 1 Screening of Alternatives
report would be taken at the meeting this evening or via e-mail
by July 31, 2001. He noted that 15 contaminants of concern (COCs)
have been identified at Demo Area 1, including Royal Demolition
Explosive (RDX), High Melting Explosive (HMX), trinitrotoluene (TNT),
2-amino dinitrotoluene (2A-DNT), 2,4-dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT), 2,6-dinitrotoluene
(2,6-DNT), nitroglycerine, and hexachlorobenzene.
Gregson reported that approximately 4375 cubic yards of soil at
Demo Area 1 have been identified for removal and subsequent treatment.
He stated that the bulk of excavation would occur at the bottom
of Demo Area 1, and other areas outside of Demo Area 1 would be
Gregson noted that part of the screening report is an assessment
of soil associated with burn pits identified at Demo Area 1. Since
the report was delivered, additional burn pits have been discovered
during excavation of magnetic anomalies at Demo Area 1.
Hugus asked Mr. Gregson to describe a burn pit and the kind of activities
that happened there. Mr. Gregson replied that these pits, which
appear to have been used as open burn areas for munitions, are identified
by black ash and fragments of munitions in the soil. Mr. Borci added
that munitions would be placed along with scrap, wood, and paper,
and burned with fuel so that the explosives would melt rather than
explode. Mr. Gregson stated that the COCs identified in burn pits,
which include antimony, lead, arsenic, dioxins, hexachlorobenzene,
4-methylphenol, and benzene, and are typically found at much higher
concentrations than surrounding soil and may require a different
type of treatment.
Gregson noted that there is a table in the handout that lists all
the technologies assessed for Demo Area 1. He reported that 12 remedial
alternatives were developed from the retained technologies. Each
remedial alternative was screened in accordance with Administrative
Order # 3 (AO#3), based on their effectiveness, implementability,
and cost. As a result of this process, seven remedial alternatives
were retained and five were eliminated.
Gregson reported that the remedial alternatives that were eliminated
were the minimal action, the excavation and incineration, and the
in-situ alternatives, which included capping, land farming, and
thermal blanket. Remedial alternatives that were retained were the
excavation alternatives of off-site land disposal, on-site composting,
bioslurry treatment, chemical reduction, solidification stabilization,
and thermal desorption.
Feigenbaum asked if the retained alternatives address the top layer
of soil only. Mr. Gregson replied that the majority of the soil
would be treated; however, there would still be residual RDX at
depth, which would be migrating into the water table. An alternative
to remediate the RDX at depth would be to construct an infiltration
gallery, combined with a groundwater treatment remedy. Mr. Gregson
added that currently the Guard is trying to establish the historic
bottom of Demo Area 1, and ultimately will excavate everything above
the historic bottom. He noted that native soil below the historic
bottom would likely contain dissolved RDX. Dr. Feigenbaum then asked
Mr. Gregson to describe thermal desorption. Mr. Gregson replied
that with thermal desorption the soil would be heated and any volatiles
would be captured in a vapor-phase carbon filtration unit.
Hugus asked which alternatives, other than off-site disposal, would
be good for burn pit soil. Mr. Borci replied that the level of dioxin
contained in burn pits eliminates most treatment technologies except
for off-site disposal. He added that dioxins could have been created
by incomplete combustion of chlorinated compounds like hexachlorobenzene;
he noted that very high dioxin levels were found next to burnt flares.
Hugus asked Mr. Gregson to explain the Innovative Technology Evaluation
(ITE) program, which was mentioned in the report. Mr. Gregson replied
that about a year ago the Guard started the ITE program to try to
evaluate and identify what could be considered an innovative technology.
He stated that the ITE is a group, which consists of representatives
from the Guard, AMEC, the Army Environmental Center (AEC), and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), evaluates technologies
that may be applicable at MMR.
Hugus then asked why EPA disapproved of the Demo Area 1 screening
report. Mr. Borci explained that EPA has several options when reviewing
a document. EPA can approve a document, approve a document with
modifications, or disapprove a document. Based on the number of
modifications that needed to be made to the Demo Area 1 Screening
of Alternatives report, EPA disapproved the report and asked the
Guard to resubmit it within two weeks. He added that one of EPA’s
concerns was that a number of burn pits were discovered in the field
after the document was written. Another concern was that more attention
and detail should have been given to the native soil located at
and below the historical bottom of Demo Area 1.
Dow stated that he is concerned about the effectiveness of the soil
washing process. He suggested that a pilot test be conducted and
that a sequential treatment process be developed for different contaminants
attached to or in the matrix of the soil. He also said that most
of the community thought that desorption and thermal treatment was
an inappropriate technology clean up soils at the fire training
areas, and he doesn’t see any changes that would make this appropriate
for cleanup in the Impact Area today. Mr. Gregson asked Mr. Dow
to explain what some of the concerns of the community were. Mr.
Dow replied that it was thought thermal desorption would not capture
all of the contaminants and could create more problems than excavating
and removing the soil.
Borci clarified that any of the treatment technologies could be
used in combination with any other. The technologies that are carried
forward into the feasibility study would determine which combination
of technologies would be appropriate.
Item #5. Depleted Uranium Report.
Myer stated that the historical review of the response from Textron
to the section 104E information request showed that from 1982 through
1984 11 depleted uranium (DU) warheads were loaded at the J-3 Range
and 11 DU warheads were shipped to a weapons testing facility in
New Mexico. In 1998 the Guard conducted a DU survey and citizens
became concerned that DU may have been used at some defense contractor
ranges. CPT Myer noted that the regulatory agencies were not involved
in this DU survey.
Myer reported that in July 2000 the regulators, the Guard, and contractors
discussed the need to conduct additional DU survey work at defense
contractor ranges. The final work plan for the DU investigation
report was finalized and approved by the regulatory agencies in
January 2001, and a scope of work was developed with the agencies
to address all data gaps from the previous DU survey. During the
archive search interview process, one of the interviewees identified
some areas where DU may have been used on some of the ranges. Fieldwork
was conducted and the draft DU report was submitted in June. The
Guard received comments back from EPA in July 2001.
Myer explained that the investigation, which screened for radiation
at selected sites, involved analyzing for total uranium, not the
specific isotope of DU. He also stated that the investigation work
complied with the Multi Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation
Manual (MARSSIM). He explained that the MARSSIM document, which
was put together by EPA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DoD),
provides a uniform way to perform radiation survey investigations.
Myer reported that at the J-1 Range a beta gamma and a gamma survey
were conducted of soils beneath the steel plate at the 1000-meter
berm. Four penetration points were selected, the plate was removed,
soil samples were collected from 0–1 foot and 3-4 feet, and the
samples were analyzed. Also, background soil samples were collected
and analyzed for total uranium, gross alpha and gross beta.
Myer noted that at the J-3 Range beta gamma and gamma surveys were
conducted at areas 5, 7, and 9. Five soil samples were collected
at the warhead test firing range, and a background sample also was
collected. The background sample was nondetect for total uranium
(TU), and showed 17 counts per minute (CPM) for gross alpha, and
21 CPM for gross beta.
Myer explained that an alpha survey was conducted on the steel plates,
but not on the soils, because alpha particles are low energy particles.
If DU was fired and the DU isotope was in the soil, soil would shield
any alpha readings or alpha particle emissions. Therefore gamma
and beta gamma surveys were done on the soils. He also noted that
the background sample for steel plate filings, at plate number 6,
was nondetect for total uranium, gross alpha, and gross beta.
Myer stated that at the U Range alpha and beta gamma surveys were
done of a tank target and the
buffer area around the tank. Daily background surveys were conducted
at three locations, and measurements for alpha, gamma, and beta
gamma were taken in order to get a baseline measurement, because
naturally-occurring radiation fluctuates. CPT Myer noted that all
the instruments were calibrated with certified sources and all sampling
and analytical protocols conformed to EPA requirements for quality
control. He added that procedures outlined in the work plan were
approved by the regulatory agencies.
Myer reported that the commonly used screening criteria by EPA and
NRC for radiological contamination is two times the background rate.
The investigation results identified two areas that were equal to
two times the background. At the J-3 Range, area 9/grid 4 measured
70 CPM, for beta gamma, and the background was 35 CPM. On steel
plate number 1, there was a beta gamma measurement of 70 CPM, and
the background was 35 CPM; alpha was nondetect. CPT Myer noted that
the survey looked at different suspect areas on the plate that could
have been perforation holes from potential DU shape charges; out
of all the measurements, there was only one that was equal to twice
Myer noted that for the steel plate and the location at the J-3
Range, the beta gamma result did not exceed twice the background;
rather it was equal to twice the background, and none of the alpha
measurements exceeded background. He said that readings of an actual
DU detection have measurements in the 200+ CPM range, and when there
is a potential presence of total uranium both alpha and beta gamma
measurements are typically present.
Myer concluded his presentation by noting that data gaps from previous
work have been filled. The results from the investigation identify
two areas with measurable levels of radiation that meet two times
the background. All remaining areas surveyed were less than two
times the background reading for soil, metal filings, alpha, gamma,
and beta gamma surveys. He also said that regulatory comments still
need to be discussed and public comments incorporated into the DU
report before it is finalized.
Kinney questioned the margin of variability in the measurements,
given that the background number fluctuates daily. Mr. Hill of Tetra
Tech introduced himself as the person who actually performed the
measurements. He noted that he took background measurements from
locations outside the J-1 gate and the J-3 gate, and down the road
from the J-3 Range in order to establish a baseline of soils that
was similar in makeup, but not in close proximity to where contamination
might be present. He explained that the background readings were
averages; actual readings varied from 30 CPM to 40 CPM per day or
by a factor of about 10 CPM. Mr. Hill added that he has investigated
sites where DU was used and those readings ranged from 200 CPM to
500 CPM, so the measurements at Camp Edwards are very low.
Kinney asked how reliable the measurements are, given the amount
of variability. Mr. Hill explained that lower CPMs are vulnerable
to more statistical error. He also noted that the highest readings
are the ones listed in the tables, even though he collected many
more readings that were much lower; the highest readings were kept
to be conservative. Mr. Hill stated that where measurements were
twice the background, he checked more carefully for an increase
in CPM, and didn’t see any increase in the measurements.
Hugus asked if there is a signature for a DU hit, and whether DU
corrodes or weathers over time. Mr. Hill replied that DU fuses with
metal, producing a gray fusion or "melting" look. He noted
that the half-life of uranium is 106 years, which is
millions of years, and corrosion or rust might act as a shield,
which is why metal filings were analyzed.
Kinney noted that the executive summary of the DU report includes
the statement that a commonly used criterion accepted by EPA a NRC
is two times the background rate to consider an area potentially
contaminated. The executive summary also includes the statement
that the survey showed that none of the suspect areas exceeded that
accepted criterion. Mr. Kinney stated that the criterion was met,
not exceeded, and the wording in the report puts a red flag up for
him. He then asked why the report doesn’t recommend additional data
collection or sampling and analysis activities. CPT Myer replied
that the Guard is going to discuss these issues with the regulators
and other experts, and then decide whether or not further action
should be taken.
the IART’s request at the August 28, 2001 meeting for further clarification,
a portion of the verbatim transcript has been included below:
Mr. Hugus: My final comment is that since there
were two hits that reached an action level, that further testing
be done. And that I see that there’s real sensitivity to location
when this testing takes place and that it would be, well for
one thing easy to miss DU. You could even miss it on a steel
plate looking at the variety of measurements there just on the
same plate. So maybe a refinement of the testing and certainly
as Joel and Jamie were alluding to, retesting the two hits to
see about fluctuation.
Myer: Well we’ll take that into consideration. We’re going
to talk with the EPA and the DEP about the comments on the reports
and where we go next. I mean, that’s the next step of the process.
Tonight I was here to present you the information and overview
of what we did to give you an understanding of that, what the
results, what our interpretation of it is. And the next steps,
as I said on the slide with future steps, is to negotiate, discuss
the comments with EPA and DEP and make that evaluation. We’ve
got, you know, we’re using our experts. The information says
what it says, we’re using the standards that were developed
by EPA, NRC, DOE, DOD. I mean everyone bought into this process,
even the regulatory folks bought into it. So, there’s a defined
process and we’re moving down the road to see what we do next.
Murphy thanked CPT Myer and announced that additional comments can
be e-mailed or faxed to Mr. Gregson at the Impact Area Groundwater
Study Program office, at 508-968-5286.
Item #6. Investigations Update.
Gregson reported that new detections include perchlorate detected
in two wells at Demo Area 1. Well 35M1 had a perchlorate detection
at 4 parts per billion (ppb), and well 75M2 had a perchlorate detection
at 9 ppb. Unvalidated detections include 2ppb for perchlorate in
well 90MW0022, located west of the J-3 Wetland, and 2 ppb for perchlorate
at well 158S, located at the entrance to the J-2 Range.
Feigenbaum inquired about the health advisory level for perchlorate.
Mr. Borci informed that a level has not yet been established, but
is being developed. He said that he expects that the level will
be in the 4 to 18 ppb range.
Gregson stated that as part of an investigation of apparent wastewater
disposal by Textron or AVCO at the location of the 1000-meter berm,
well 136 was installed in the vicinity of the popper kettle, which
is a steel box used to burn munitions. At that well, RDX was detected
at 1.6 ppb and HMX was detected at 1.9 ppb. Downgradient of this
area three wells were installed: well 166, which had RDX detections
ranging from 0.5 to 4.7 ppb, and HMX detections ranging from 0.7
to 0.49 ppb; well 58, which had a RDX detection at 7.4 ppb, and
an HMX detection at 1.2 ppb; and well 168, which showed no detections
of explosives. Well 58S had a RDX detection of 5.3ppb and HMX at
1.4 ppb and well 164 had a detection of RDX at 12 ppb and HMX at
Range Investigation and the Petroleum-like Material (PLM)
Gregson reported that the PLM was identified in well 164, well 168,
and in monitoring well 170, which is located to the north of the
former K Range. He noted that testing of the drill rig fluid ruled
out the rig itself as a source of this material, and a fingerprint
fuels analysis indicated that the PLM is a hydrocarbon, similar
to Jet Petroleum 8 (JP-8), or a kerosene or diesel-type material.
He noted that a number of semi-volatile organic compounds (SVOCs)
were detected, including n-nitrosodiphenylamine; 2,4-dimethylphenol;
2- methylnaphthalene, which would be a fuel component; bis-2-ethylhexylphthalate;
and di-n-butyl phthalate, fluorene, and naphthalene, which were
all typical fuel semivolatiles; and phenol. Herbicide/pesticide
analyses were nondetect. Extractable petroleum hydrocarbon (EPH)
analysis is ongoing. This method, which is used under the MADEP
Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) provides a measurement of concentrations
of different types of petroleum compounds as well as a more detailed
forensic fingerprint that could provide more information on the
type and potential source of the PLM.
Gregson continued his update on the J Range investigation by noting
that future actions include the installation of five additional
wells proposed for the vicinity of the 1000-meter berm. Well J1P4
would be installed to provide additional information on the particle
backtracks from wells 164 and 168; well J1P11 would be a cross-gradient
well; well J1P12 would be located downgradient of well 166; and
well J1P13 would be a cross-gradient well to help bound, or perhaps
detect again, the PLM found in well 164. The purpose of well J1P14
would be to help bound contamination on the east side and evaluate
potential sources for the PLM.
Ranges Response Plan
Gregson also stated that the J Range Response Plan, which pertains
to the Snake Pond area, includes conducting biweekly sampling of
drive-points and surface water near the Snake Pond beaches. He noted
that three surface water samples were collected in the north cove
area of Snake Pond and drive-point and surface water samples were
all nondetect. He also reported that the Guard is working with the
USGS to find a diffusion sampling membrane that will allow an RDX
molecule to pass through. A membrane is currently being tested using
water samples carrying a range of concentrations to see if RDX will
pass through the membrane. In addition, two existing sentry wells
will be sampled from Weeks Pond to get more information on the western
edge of Snake Pond.
Item #7. Other Issues
Arms Ranges Investigation Update
Gregson stated that currently the Guard is in the middle of Phase
2b of the investigation, and has provided information on S, E, G,
and I Range, which are the current Small Arms Ranges locations.
He noted that data from four historical ranges will be arriving
soon and will be presented as part of the Phase 2b report on August
20, 2001. Based on information in the Phase 2b report, the Guard
will assess what additional former or current small arms ranges
require further investigation. He also noted that the AEC currently
is testing emissions from traditional M-16 rounds and green M-16
Item #8. Agenda Planning and Review Action Items
Murphy stated that the CS-18 update and the Phase 2b report will
be on the agenda for the August IART meeting. Mr. Murphy then reviewed
the action items as they appear at the end of these minutes.
Item #9. Adjourn
Murphy announced that the next IART meeting is scheduled for August
28, 2001 and then adjourned the meeting at 9:20 p.m.
requested that the Guard provide a technical response that explains
the amount of anomalies shown on the Central Impact Area aerial
magnetometry survey map border.
EPA will discuss updating the Snake Pond posting with the Air
force Center For Environmental Excellence (AFCEE), the Sandwich
Board of Health, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
(MDPH), the Joint Program Office (JPO), and the Impact Area Groundwater
Study Program office (IAGWSP).
of Action Items